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Despite the importance of life satisfaction for health and well-being, there is a paucity of longitudinal studies tracking changes in life satisfaction in ethnic minority youth. In a sample of 674 Mexican-origin youth, the present research examined life satisfaction trajectories from middle (age 14) to late adolescence (age 17) and from late adolescence to young adulthood (age 21). On average, life satisfaction did not change significantly from age 14 to 17, and then decreased from age 17 to 21 (d = .30), perhaps reflecting difficulties transitioning into adult roles. Drawing on ecological systems theory, we examined both proximal (i.e., family) and distal (i.e., social-contextual) environmental factors (measured via self- and parent-reports) that may account for between-person variation in life satisfaction trajectories. Youth with more positive family environments in middle adolescence (age 14) had higher mean life satisfaction from middle adolescence to young adulthood (age 21). In contrast, youth with more negative family environments and who experienced greater economic hardship and more ethnic discrimination in middle adolescence (age 14) had lower life satisfaction during this period. Many of these factors also predicted change in life satisfaction from middle (age 14) to late adolescence (age 17), but not from late adolescence to young adulthood (age 21). This research extends the current understanding of life satisfaction during a critical developmental period in an understudied population. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).In 14 studies, we tested whether political conservatives' stronger free will beliefs were linked to stronger and broader tendencies to moralize and, thus, a greater motivation to assign blame. In Study 1 (meta-analysis of 5 studies, n = 308,499) we show that conservatives have stronger tendencies to moralize than liberals, even for moralization measures containing zero political content (e.g., moral badness ratings of faces and personality traits). In Study 2, we show that conservatives report higher free will belief, and this is statistically mediated by the belief that people should be held morally responsible for their bad behavior (n = 14,707). In Study 3, we show that political conservatism is associated with higher attributions of free will for specific events. Turning to experimental manipulations to test our hypotheses, we show the following when conservatives and liberals see an action as equally wrong there is no difference in free will attributions (Study 4); when conservatives see an action as less wrong than liberals, they attribute less free will (Study 5); and specific perceptions of wrongness account for the relation between political ideology and free will attributions (Study 6a and 6b). Finally, we show that political conservatives and liberals even differentially attribute free will for the same action depending on who performed it (Studies 7a-d). These results are consistent with our theory that political differences in free will belief are at least partly explicable by conservatives' tendency to moralize, which strengthens motivation to justify blame with stronger belief in free will and personal accountability. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).People often form attitudes about objects, individuals, or groups by examining and comparing their attributes. Such attribute-based attitude formation is guided by a differentiation principle Whether people come to like or dislike an attitude object depends on the object's attributes that differentiate it from other objects. Attributes that are redundant with previously encountered attitude objects are typically cancelled out. GW 501516 We tested whether the same differentiation principle applies to co-occurrence-based attitude formation, also known as Evaluative Conditioning. This form of attitude formation describes the phenomenon that attitudes are influenced by positive or negative stimuli that have co-occurred with attitude object, but which are not inherent attributes of the attitude object itself. Across 7 experiments (N = 1611), we consistently found that co-occurrence-based attitude formation is guided by the same differentiation principle as attribute-based attitude formation. Specifically, participants' attitudes toward unknown brands were most strongly influenced by positive or negative stimuli that distinctly co-occurred with a specific brand, and that differentiated that brand from previously encountered ones. Stimuli that redundantly co-occurred with multiple brands had weaker influences on brand attitudes. The results further suggest that differentiation operates at the learning stage during which distinct stimulus co-occurrences enjoy a processing advantage. We discuss the present findings' theoretical and practical implications for attitude formation and identify differentiation as a possible cause of biased attitudes. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).Previous studies have shown that people are faster to process objects that they own as compared with objects that other people own. Yet object ownership is embedded within a social environment that has distinct and sometimes competing rules for interaction. Here we ask whether ownership of space can act as a filter through which we process what belongs to us. Can a sense of territory modulate the well-established benefits in information processing that owned objects enjoy? In 4 experiments participants categorized their own or another person's objects that appeared in territories assigned either to themselves or to another. We consistently found that faster processing of self-owned than other-owned objects only emerged for objects appearing in the self-territory, with no such advantage in other territories. We propose that knowing whom spaces belong to may serve to define the space in which affordances resulting from ownership lead to facilitated processing. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).Upon making a decision, we typically have a sense of the likelihood that the decision we reached was a good one; that is, a degree of confidence in our choice. In a series of five experiments, we tested the hypothesis that confidence acts as an intrinsic cost-benefit factor when choosing between tasks, biasing people toward situations in which they experience higher confidence. Participants performed a task-selection paradigm in which they chose on each trial between two perceptual-judgment tasks that were matched for objective difficulty but differed in participants' experienced confidence, with confidence manipulated via differences in the strength of postdecisional evidence. The results show that participants exhibited a preference for tasks in which they reported higher confidence. The effect of confidence on task selection went above and beyond simple error detection, with people not only avoiding tasks in which they believed they made an error, but also tending to select tasks in which they experienced higher confidence in their correct responses.