Abelmackay3934

Using estimates for 1,2-IHN Henry's law constant and atmospheric liquid water volume, we show that condensed-phase hydrolysis of 1,2-IHN can account for this loss process. Simulations from a global chemistry transport model show that the hydrolysis of 1,2-IHN accounts for a substantial fraction of NOx lost (and HNO3 produced), resulting in large impacts on oxidant formation, especially over forested regions.An important aspect of intelligence is the ability to adapt to a novel task without any direct experience (zero shot), based on its relationship to previous tasks. Humans can exhibit this cognitive flexibility. By contrast, models that achieve superhuman performance in specific tasks often fail to adapt to even slight task alterations. To address this, we propose a general computational framework for adapting to novel tasks based on their relationship to prior tasks. We begin by learning vector representations of tasks. To adapt to new tasks, we propose metamappings, higher-order tasks that transform basic task representations. We demonstrate the effectiveness of this framework across a wide variety of tasks and computational paradigms, ranging from regression to image classification and reinforcement learning. We compare to both human adaptability and language-based approaches to zero-shot learning. Across these domains, metamapping is successful, often achieving 80 to 90% performance, without any data, on a novel task, even when the new task directly contradicts prior experience. We further show that metamapping can not only generalize to new tasks via learned relationships, but can also generalize using novel relationships unseen during training. Finally, using metamapping as a starting point can dramatically accelerate later learning on a new task and reduce learning time and cumulative error substantially. Our results provide insight into a possible computational basis of intelligent adaptability and offer a possible framework for modeling cognitive flexibility and building more flexible artificial intelligence systems.In the past, a vast majority of medical assistance in dying (MAiD) patients were elderly patients with cancer who are not suitable for organ donation, making organ donation from such patients a rare event. However, more expansive criteria for MAiD combined with an increased participation of MAiD patients in organ donation is likely to drastically increase the pool of MAiD patients who can serve as organ donors. Previous discussions of ethical issues arising from these trends have not fully addressed difficulties involved in separating decision to end one's life from the one to donate one's organs. However, realities of organ donation logistics and human decision making suggest that this separation can be extraordinary difficult. The need to maximise quality of donated organs complicates dying experience of the donor and is likely in tension with the dying experience the patient envisioned when first considering MAiD. PLX4032 Furthermore, the idea that patients will think about MAiD first, and only when firmly decided to end their life, consider organ donation, runs contrary to organ donation policies in some countries as well as end of life and everyday decision making. This opens the door for organ donation to serve as an incentive in MAiD decisions. Dispensing with the simplistic assumption that organ donation can never be a factor in MAiD decisions is, therefore, essential first step to properly addressing ethical issues at hand.Opponents of abortion are often described as 'inconsistent' (hypocrites) in terms of their beliefs, actions and/or priorities. They are alleged to do too little to combat spontaneous abortion, they should be adopting cryopreserved embryos with greater frequency and so on. These types of arguments-which we call 'inconsistency arguments'-conform to a common pattern. Each specifies what consistent opponents of abortion would do (or believe), asserts that they fail to act (or believe) accordingly and concludes that they are inconsistent. Here, we show that inconsistency arguments fail en masse. In short, inconsistency arguments typically face four problems. First, they usually fail to account for diversity among opponents of abortion. Second, they rely on inferences about consistency based on isolated beliefs shared by some opponents of abortion (and these inferences often do not survive once we consider other beliefs opponents of abortion tend to hold). Third, inconsistency arguments usually ignore the diverse ways in which opponents of abortion might act on their beliefs. Fourth, inconsistency arguments criticise groups of people without threatening their beliefs (eg, that abortion is immoral). Setting these problems aside, even supposing inconsistency arguments are successful, they hardly matter. In fact, in the two best-case scenarios-where inconsistency arguments succeed-they either encourage millions of people to make the world a (much) worse place (from the critic's perspective) or promote epistemically and morally irresponsible practices. We conclude that a more valuable discussion would be had by focusing on the arguments made by opponents of abortion rather than opponents themselves.Scheduling surgical procedures among operating rooms (ORs) is mistakenly regarded as merely a tedious administrative task. However, the growing demand for surgical care and finite hours in a day qualify OR time as a limited resource. Accordingly, the objective of this manuscript is to reframe the process of OR scheduling as an ethical dilemma of allocating scarce medical resources. Recommendations for ethical allocation of OR time-based on both familiar and novel ethical values-are provided for healthcare institutions and individual surgeons.In their response to 'Public interest in health data research laying out the conceptual groundwork', Grewal and Newson critique us for inattention to the law and putting forward an impracticably broad conceptual understanding of public interest. While we agree more work is needed to generate a workable framework for Institutional Review Boards/Research Ethics Committees (IRBs/RECs), we would contend that this should be grounded on a broad conception of public interest. This broadness facilitates regulatory agility, and is already reflected by some current frameworks such as that found in the guidelines approved under Australia's Privacy Act. It remains unclear which elements of our broad account Grewal and Newson would reject, or indeed where the substantive disagreement with our position lies.