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The time a reader's eyes spend on a word is influenced by visual (e.g., contrast) as well as lexical (e.g., word frequency) and contextual (e.g., predictability) factors. Well-known visual word recognition models predict that visual and higher-level manipulations may have interactive effects on early eye movement measures, because of cascaded processing between levels. Previous eye movement studies provide conflicting evidence as to whether they do, possibly because of inconsistent manipulations or limited statistical power. In the present study, 2 highly powered experiments used sentences in which a target word's frequency and predictability were factorially manipulated. Experiment 1 also manipulated visual contrast, and Experiment 2 also manipulated font difficulty. Robust main effects of all manipulations were evident in both experiments. In Experiment 1, interactions between the effect of contrast and the effects of frequency and predictability were numerically small and statistically unreliable in both early (word skipping, first fixation duration) and later (gaze duration, go-past time) measures. In Experiment 2, frequency and predictability did demonstrate convincing interactions with font difficulty, but only in the later measures, possibly implicating a checking mechanism. We conclude that although the predicted interactions in early eye movement measures may exist, they are sufficiently weak that they are difficult to detect even in large eye movement experiments. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).The current study used an eye tracker to examine how auditory input affects the latency of visual saccades, fixations, and response times while using variations of a Serial Response Time (SRT) task. In Experiment 1, participants viewed a repeating sequence of visual stimuli that appeared in different locations on a computer monitor and they had to quickly determine if each visual stimulus was red/blue. The visual sequence was either presented in silence or paired with tones. Compared with the silent condition, the tones slowed down red/blue discriminations and delayed the latency of first fixations to the visual stimuli. To ensure the interference was not occurring during the decision or response phase and to better understand the nature of auditory interference, we removed the red/blue discrimination task in Experiment 2, manipulated cognitive load, and developed a gaze-contingent procedure where the timing of each visual stimulus was dependent on a saccade crossing a gaze-contingent boundary surrounding the target. Participants were slower at initiating their saccades or fixations and made more fixations under high load. As in Experiment 1, auditory interference was found with participants being more likely to fixate on the visual stimuli and were faster at fixating on the visual stimuli in the unimodal condition. These findings suggest that auditory interference effects occur early in the course of processing and provide insights into potential mechanisms underlying modality dominance effects. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).In virtually all areas of psychology, the question of whether a particular construct has a prospective effect on another is of fundamental importance. For decades, the cross-lagged panel model (CLPM) has been the model of choice for addressing this question. However, CLPMs have recently been critiqued, and numerous alternative models have been proposed. Using the association between low self-esteem and depression as a case study, we examined the behavior of seven competing longitudinal models in 10 samples, each with at least four waves of data and sample sizes ranging from 326 to 8,259. The models were compared in terms of convergence, fit statistics, and consistency of parameter estimates. The traditional CLPM and the random intercepts cross-lagged panel model (RI-CLPM) converged in every sample, whereas the other models frequently failed to converge or did not converge properly. The RI-CLPM exhibited better model fit than the CLPM, whereas the CLPM produced more consistent cross-lagged effects (both across and within samples) than the RI-CLPM. We discuss the models from a conceptual perspective, emphasizing that the models test conceptually distinct psychological and developmental processes, and we address the implications of the empirical findings with regard to model selection. Ilomastat mouse Moreover, we provide practical recommendations for researchers interested in testing prospective associations between constructs and suggest using the CLPM when focused on between-person effects and the RI-CLPM when focused on within-person effects. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).How do people respond to risk in important life decisions? For example, when presented with the opportunity to leave one's job to start a business-a risky proposition for most-or to stay put-often a safer course of action-what do people choose? The current work explores the idea that important life decisions offer people the opportunity to display a highly valued psychological characteristic courage. Specifically, important life decisions often combine the critical preconditions for a risky choice to be viewed as courageous-fear, purpose, agency, and the availability of risky options with an appropriate risk/reward tradeoff. Because of this combination of features, to the extent people desire to be courageous, they are motivated to choose risky options in important life decisions. The present perspective offers a counterpoint to prior work on decision making that assumes individuals are generally risk averse. Seven primary and 2 supplemental studies provide evidence in support of this perspective. Implications for understanding decision making in important decisions, the value of courage, and the motivated pursuit of risk are discussed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).In this article we examine intolerance toward ideological outgroups, conceptualized as the negativity of the attitudes of liberals and conservatives toward their ideological outgroup. We show that conservatives are more ideologically intolerant than liberals and that the more intelligent are more ideologically intolerant than the less intelligent. We also show that the differences between liberals and conservatives and the differences between the more and less intelligent depend on ideological extremity They are larger for extreme than for moderate ideologists. The implication of these results to questions regarding the relationship between intelligence and ideological intolerance and regarding the relationship between ideology and prejudice are discussed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).