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The term 'life-history theory' (LHT) is increasingly often invoked in psychology, as a framework for integrating understanding of psychological traits into a broader evolutionary context. Although LHT as presented in psychology papers (LHT-P) is typically described as a straightforward extension of the theoretical principles from evolutionary biology that bear the same name (LHT-E), the two bodies of work are not well integrated. Here, through a close reading of recent papers, we argue that LHT-E and LHT-P are different research programmes in the Lakatosian sense. CHR2797 The core of LHT-E is built around ultimate evolutionary explanation, via explicit mathematical modelling, of how selection can drive divergent evolution of populations or species living under different demographies or ecologies. The core of LHT-P concerns measurement of covariation, across individuals, of multiple psychological traits; the proximate goals these serve; and their relation to childhood experience. Some of the links between LHT-E and LHT-P are false friends. For example, elements that are marginal in LHT-E are core commitments of LHT-P, and where explanatory principles are transferred from one to the other, nuance can be lost in transmission. The methodological rules for what grounds a prediction in theory are different in the two cases. Though there are major differences between LHT-E and LHT-P at present, there is much potential for greater integration in the future, through both theoretical modelling and further empirical research. This article is part of the theme issue 'Life history and learning how childhood, caregiving and old age shape cognition and culture in humans and other animals'.Across mammals, cues of developmental support, such as touching, licking or attentiveness, stimulate neural development, behavioural exploration and even overall body growth. Why should such fitness-related traits be so sensitive to developmental conditions? Here, we review what we term the 'developmental support hypothesis', a potential adaptive explanation of this plasticity. Neural development can be a costly process, in terms of time, energy and exposure. However, environmental variability may sometimes compromise parental care during this costly developmental period. We propose this environmental variation has led to the evolution of adaptive plasticity of neural and behavioural development in response to cues of developmental support, where neural development is stimulated in conditions that support associated costs. When parental care is compromised, offspring grow less and adopt a more resilient and stress-responsive strategy, improving their chances of survival in difficult conditions, similar to existing ideas on the adaptive value of early-life programming of stress. The developmental support hypothesis suggests new research directions, such as testing the adaptive value of reduced neural growth and metabolism in stressful conditions, and expanding the range of potential cues animals may attend to as indicators of developmental support. Considering evolutionary and ecologically appropriate cues of social support also has implications for promoting healthy neural development in humans. This article is part of the theme issue 'Life history and learning how childhood, caregiving and old age shape cognition and culture in humans and other animals'.Natural selection has evidently mediated many species characteristics relevant to the evolution of learning, including longevity, length of the juvenile period, social organization, timing of cognitive and motor development, and age-related shifts in behavioural propensities such as activity level, flexibility in problem-solving and motivation to seek new information. Longitudinal studies of wild populations can document such changes in behavioural propensities, providing critical information about the contexts in which learning strategies develop, in environments similar to those in which learning strategies evolved. The Lomas Barbudal Monkey Project provides developmental data for the white-faced capuchin, Cebus capucinus, a species that has converged with humans regarding many life-history and behavioural characteristics. In this dataset, focused primarily on learned aspects of foraging behaviour, younger capuchins are more active overall, more curious and opportunistic, and more prone to inventing new investigative and foraging-related behaviours. Younger individuals more often seek social information by watching other foragers (especially older foragers). Younger individuals are more creative, playful and inventive, and less neophobic, exhibiting a wider range of behaviours when engaged in extractive foraging. Whereas adults more often stick with old solutions, younger individuals often incorporate recently acquired experience (both social and asocial) when foraging. This article is part of the theme issue 'Life history and learning how childhood, caregiving and old age shape cognition and culture in humans and other animals'.Traditional attempts to understand the evolution of human cognition compare humans with other primates. This research showed that relative brain size covaries with cognitive skills, while adaptations that buffer the developmental and energetic costs of large brains (e.g. allomaternal care), and ecological or social benefits of cognitive abilities, are critical for their evolution. To understand the drivers of cognitive adaptations, it is profitable to consider distant lineages with convergently evolved cognitions. Here, we examine the facilitators of cognitive evolution in corvid birds, where some species display cultural learning, with an emphasis on family life. link2 We propose that extended parenting (protracted parent-offspring association) is pivotal in the evolution of cognition it combines critical life-history, social and ecological conditions allowing for the development and maintenance of cognitive skillsets that confer fitness benefits to individuals. This novel hypothesis complements the extended childnd learning how childhood, caregiving and old age shape cognition and culture in humans and other animals'.Social learning and life history interact in human adaptation, but nearly all models of the evolution of social learning omit age structure and population regulation. Further progress is hindered by a poor appreciation of how life history affects selection on learning. We discuss why life history and age structure are important for social learning and present an exemplary model of the evolution of social learning in which demographic properties of the population arise endogenously from assumptions about per capita vital rates and different forms of population regulation. We find that, counterintuitively, a stronger reliance on social learning is favoured in organisms characterized by 'fast' life histories with high mortality and fertility rates compared to 'slower' life histories typical of primates. Long lifespans make early investment in learning more profitable and increase the probability that the environment switches within generations. link3 Both effects favour more individual learning. Additionally, under fertility regulation (as opposed to mortality regulation), more juveniles are born shortly after switches in the environment when many adults are not adapted, creating selection for more individual learning. To explain the empirical association between social learning and long life spans and to appreciate the implications for human evolution, we need further modelling frameworks allowing strategic learning and cumulative culture. This article is part of the theme issue 'Life history and learning how childhood, caregiving and old age shape cognition and culture in humans and other animals'.Humans possess some unique social-cognitive skills and motivations, involving such things as joint attention, cooperative communication, dual-level collaboration and cultural learning. These are almost certainly adaptations for humans' especially complex sociocultural lives. The common assumption has been that these unique skills and motivations emerge in human infancy and early childhood as preparations for the challenges of adult life, for example, in collaborative foraging. In the current paper, I propose that the curiously early emergence of these skills in infancy--well before they are needed in adulthood--along with other pieces of evidence (such as almost exclusive use with adults not peers) suggests that aspects of the evolution of these skills represent ontogenetic adaptations to the unique socio-ecological challenges human infants face in the context of a regime of cooperative breeding and childcare. This article is part of the theme issue 'Life history and learning how childhood, caregiving and old age shape cognition and culture in humans and other animals'.Humans evolved from an ape ancestor that was highly intelligent, moderately social and moderately dependent on cultural adaptations for subsistence technology (tools). By the late Pleistocene, humans had become highly dependent on culture for subsistence and for rules to organize a complex social life. Adaptation by cultural traditions transformed our life history, leading to an extended juvenile period to learn subsistence and social skills, post-reproductive survival to help conserve and transmit skills, a dependence on social support for mothers of large-brained, very dependent and nutrient-demanding offspring, males devoting substantial effort to provisioning rather than mating, and the cultivation of large social networks to tap pools in information unavailable to less social species. One measure of the success of the exploitation of culture is that the minimum inter-birth interval of humans is nearly half that of our ape relatives. Another measure is the wide geographical distribution of humans compared with other apes, based on subsistence systems adapted to fine-scale spatial environmental variation. An important macro-evolutionary question is why our big-brained, culture-intensive life-history strategy evolved so recently and in only our lineage. We suggest that increasing spatial and temporal variation in the Pleistocene favoured cultural adaptations. This article is part of the theme issue 'Life history and learning how childhood, caregiving and old age shape cognition and culture in humans and other animals'.According to the Cooperative Breeding Hypothesis, apes with the life-history attributes of those in the line leading to the genus Homo could not have evolved unless male and female allomothers had begun to help mothers care for and provision offspring. As proposed elsewhere, the unusual way hominins reared their young generated novel phenotypes subsequently subjected to Darwinian social selection favouring those young apes best at monitoring the intentions, mental states and preferences of others and most motivated to attract and appeal to caretakers. Not only were youngsters acquiring information in social contexts different from those of other apes, but they would also have been emotionally and neurophysiologically different from them in ways that are relevant to how humans learn. Contingently delivered rewards to dependents who attracted and ingratiated themselves with allomothers shaped their behaviours and vocalizations and transformed the way developing youngsters learned from others and internalized their preferences.

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