Ratio decidendi

The traditional doctrine of precedent in English common law has been that a precedent which is binding is binding only as to its ratio decidendi, that is, its 'rule of decision'. Only this is strictly authoritative for the future, and any explanatory or argumentative statements by the court or individual judges are deemed 'obiter dicta', persuasive according to their cogency and relevancy, but not binding in law. The same applies in Northern Ireland. In Scots law, it has been argued on high authority (Smith, 1952) that the difference of legal tradition has generated both a broader conception of ratio decidendi, to include general principles rather than more particular rules of decision, and a somewhat less strict view of the binding quality of individual precedents. (s.336, Interpreting Precedents, United Kingdom)

'The ratio decidendi of a case is any rule of law

expressly or impliedly treated by a judge as a necessary step in

reaching his conclusion, having regard to the line of reasoning adopted

by him, or a necessary part of his direction to the jury' (Cross, 1991,

p.72). This carries great authority, but may need some amendment in

a direction suggested by one of the present authors. As J.W. Harris

notes in his latest edition of Cross's Precedent, MacCormick's relevant

suggestion is:

A ratio decidendi is a ruling expressly or impliedly given by a judge

which is sufficient to settle a point of law put in issue by the parties'

arguments in a case, being a point on which a ruling was necessary to

his[/her] justification (or one of his[/her] alternative justifications) of

the decision in the case. (N. MacCormick, 'Why Cases Have Rationes

and What These Are', in Goldstein (1991, pp.155-82 at 170)) (s. 338, Interpreting Precedents, United Kingdom)

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